

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION BERLIN UNN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PEKING UNN

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CINCPAC

CINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5822

MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, NATO, NAC, GE, UR, WB

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SUBJ: FRG ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-GDR MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP TREATY

REF: A. STATE 249251 DTG 202309Z OCT 75 (NOTAL)

B. STATE 253128 DTG 240017Z OCT 75 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT OCTOBER 24 NAC, FRG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE KRAPF REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE OCTOBER 7 SOVIET-GDR TREATY, DISTRIBUTED TEXT OF A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT, AND CALLED FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS TREATY AT THE OCTOBER 28 MEETING OF NATO POLADS. END SUMMARY.

1. AT THE OCTOBER 24 MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, FRG AMBASSADOR KRAPF INDICATED TO NAC THE HIGHLIGHTS OF FRG ASSESSMENT OF THE OCTOBER 7 FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN THE GDR AND USSR. KRAPF SAID HE WOULD DISTRIBUTE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE ASSESSMENT, AND HOPED THE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE COULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON TREATY AT THEIR OCTOBER 28 MEETING.

2. KRAPF SAID THAT BY CONCLUDING A NEW FRIENDSHIP TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR HAVE TAKEN A LONG-EXPECTED AND BY NO MEANS SURPRISING STEP. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE BASIC MOTIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, I.E., TO CONSOLIDATE THE GDR AS AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST SECOND GERMAN STATE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO TIE THIS STATE MORE AND MORE CLOSELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THEREBY TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNDAMENTAL DEPENDENCE OF THE GDR ON THE SOVIET UNION.

3. IN CONTRAST TO THE TREATY OF 1955, THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR SAID, THE SOVIET UNION NOW REGARDS THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE GDR EXPLICITLY AS SECONDARY TO THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH RESULTS FOR IT FROM THE "PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM" AND "ETERNAL AND IRREVERSIBLE FRIENDSHIP" WITH THE USSR.

4. KRAPF EMPHASIZED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE CSCE FINAL ACT IS NOT DIRECTLY MENTIONED, THE REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBLE TO "COLLECTIVE ELABORATED PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES HAVING DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS" MAKES IT CLEAR THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT, CSCE PRINCIPLES ARE NOT BE APPLIED AS BETWEEN THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES. CONFIDENTIAL

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5. AS FAR AS SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THE FRG FEELS IMPORTANCE MUST BE ATTACHED TO THE ASSISTANCE CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE ASSISTANCE COMMITMENT UNDER THE WARSAW PACT AND THE TREATIES OF 1955 AND 1964 TO AN ATTACK "BY ANY STATE", I.E., ALSO FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE.

6. KRAPF SAID THE TREATY TEXT SHOWS CLEARLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN THE FUTURE MAKE INCREASED EFFORTS TO WARD OFF IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURES WHICH THEY FEAR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DETENTE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE TREATY CANNOT ALTER THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS "FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE" AND ESPECIALLY IT DOES NOT AFFECT THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING BERLIN. HE

POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN GREAT CARE NOT TO AGREE TO ANY MODIFICATIONS OF THE EARLIER FRIENDSHIP TREATIES BY WHICH ITS LEGAL POSITION IN GERMANY AND BERLIN WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLICITLY ABANDONED.

7. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED SAYING THE POSITION OF THE FRG VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND GDR "CONTINUES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND BY THE BASIC TREATY UPON WHOSE SIGNATURE THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS EXPLICITLY KEPT OPEN IN THE LETTERS ON THE UNITY OF THE NATION WHICH WERE ACCEPTED WITHOUT PROTEST". IN THIS CONNECTION, KRAPF SAID THE FRG WELCOMED THE OCTOBER 14, 1975 DECLARATION BY THE THREE POWERS STATING THAT THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE REMAIN UNEFFECTED BY THE USSR-GDR TREATY.

8. ACTION: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE DEPARMTMENT MAY HAVE ON FRG ASSESSMENT IN TIME FOR OCTOBER 28 POLADS.

9. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG ASSESSMENT:

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN THE GDR
AND THE USSR OF 7 OCTOBER 1975

1. BY CONCLUDING A NEW FRIENDSHIP TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR HAVE TAKEN A LONG-EXPECTED AND BY NO MEANS SURPRISING STEP.

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2. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE BASIC MOTIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, I.E. TO CONSOLIDATE THE GDR AS AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST SECOND GERMAN STATE AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO TIE THIS STATE MORE AND MORE CLOSELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THEREBY TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNDAMENTAL DEPENDENCE OF THE GDR ON THE SOVIET UNION.

3. IN CONTRAST TO THE TREATY OF 1955, THE SOVIET UNION NOW REGARDS THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE GDR EXPLICITLY AS SECONDARY TO THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH RESULT FOR IT FROM THE "PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM" AND "ETERNAL AND IRREVERSIBLE FRIENDSHIP" WITH THE USSR. THE NEW TREATY ARTICLES ON COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, INFORMATION AND CULTURAL FIELDS BUT ALSO THOSE DEALING WITH INTERNAL SECURITY CLEARLY REVEAL A TREND TO ESTABLISH A NETWORK OF LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES WHOSE INTENSITY BY FAR EXCEEDS THE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT AND COMECON.

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USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY PEKING UNN

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CINCPAC

CINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5822

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4. THE TREATY IS OF IMPORTANCE ALSO AS FAR AS SOVIET RELATIONS

WITH THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED:

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-. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE TREATY, BOTH STATES UNDERTAKE
"TO GIVE MAXIMUM ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN ALL STATES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY
AND ALWAYS TO ACT IN THE SPIRIT OF CONSOLIDATING THEIR UNITY
AND HOMOGENEITY". TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN LANGUAGE IN THE PREAMBLE,
THIS EXPRESSES THE FACT THAT BOTH CONTRACTING STATES REGARD
THEMSELVES AS PACEMAKERS OF INTEGRATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT.

- THIS TREND IS ALSO IN LINE WITH THE FACT THAT, COMPARED WITH THE TWO PREVIOUS FRIENDSHIP TREATIES, STRIKING EMPHASIS HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE COMMON IDEOLOGY AS THE BASIS FOR REALTIONS. BY COMPARISON, ASPECTS OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY ARE GIVEN LESS PROMINENCE.

- THE PREAMBLE AND THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 4 CONTAIN CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT BOTH CONTRACTING PARTIES REGARD THEMSELVES AS GUARDIANS OF THE "PRINCIPLE OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY", I.E. THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

- ALTHOUGH THE CSCE FINAL ACT IS NOT DIRECTLY MENTIONED, THE REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBLE TO "COLLECTIVELY ELABORATED PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES HAVING DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS" MAKES IT CLEAR UNEQUIVOCALLY AND IN CONTRAST TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT THAT THE CSCE PRINCIPLES ARE NOT TO BE APPLIED AS BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

- FINALLY, THE TREATY IS ALSO OF IMPORTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH HOPES IN THE WEST - BUT ALSO IN SOME EASTERN-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES - THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE AS A RESULT OF DETENTE POLICY AND THE CSCE DECISIONS TO INTENSIFY LINKS AND CONTACTS IN EUROPE ACROSS IDEOLOGICAL BARRIERS.

5. AS FAR AS SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, IMPORTANCE MUST BE ATTACHED TO THE ASSISTANCE CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE ASSISTANCE COMMITMENT UNDER THE WARSAW PACT AND THE TREATIES OF 1955 AND 1964 TO AN ATTACK "BY ANY STATE", I.E. ALSO OUTSIDE EUROPE. THIS EXTENSION IS IN CONFORMITY WITH OTHER FRIENDSHIP TREATIES NEWLY SIGNED BY THE SOVIET UNION, SUCH AS ARTICLE 10 OF THE TREATY WITH CSSR OF 1970, ARTICLE 7 OF

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THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA OF 1967 AND ARTICLE 6 OF THE TREATY WITH HUNGARY.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

- THE TEXT SHOWS CLEARLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN FUTURE MAKE INCREASED EFFORTS TO WARD OFF THE IDEOLOGICAL DANGERS WHICH ARE BEING FEARED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DETENTE BY FORCING THE OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT TO TOE THE MOSCOW LINE EVEN MORE THAN IN THE PAST.

- THE TREATY FURTHERMORE REVEALS THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH IT DID NOT SUCCEED IN PUSHING INTO THE FOREGROUND DURING THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN SPITE OF THE ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE GDR AND ITS ECONOMIC WEIGHT, THE TREATY DOES NOT GIVE IT ANY

GREATER INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. IT DOES, HOWEVER, UNDERLINE THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE GDR WITHIN THE SOVIET BLOC.

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE TREATY CANNOT ONLY BE SEEN AS THE EXPRESSION OF THE SED LEADERSHIP'S READINESS TO ACCEPT SOVIET GREAT-POWER POLITICS. IT SEEMS THAT THE GDR LEADERSHIP HAS DECIDED TO SEEK THE PROTECTION AND STRENGTHENING OF ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

9. THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF THAT PART OF THE TREATY DEALING WITH GERMANY DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION:

- THE REFERENCES CONTAINED IN THE TREATIES OF 1955 AND 1964 TO THE SITUATION IN GERMANY, ESPECIALLY TO THE NEED FOR A GERMAN PEACE TREATY, THE RESTORATION OF THE UNITY OF GERMANY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE FOUR POWERS DO NOT APPEAR IN THE NEW TREATY.

- GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE TREATY OF 7 OCTOBER 1975 ASSUMES THAT THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND GERMANY IS ESSENTIALLY CONSOLIDATED. THE GERMAN QUESTION IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED AN UNSETTLED PROBLEM; FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ARE VIEWED CONFIDENTIAL

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ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS QUO.

- THE VALIDITY OF THE TREATY IS NO LONGER MADE DEPENDENT ON A FUTURE CHANGE OF THE SITUATION IN GERMANY. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT HAS SIMPLY BEEN MENTIONED IN THE PREAMBLE IN THE SENSE THAT IT HAD BEEN FULFILLED BY THE GDR, BUT THE EXPLICIT DEMAND CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 2 OF THE 1964 TREATY THAT THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY HAS BEEN OMITTED.

- THE INVIOABILITY OF NATIONAL FRONTIERS IN EUROPE IS EMPHASIZED IN ARTICLE 6 AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL CHANGES OF FRONTIERS. THE LANGUAGE OF THE ARTICLE AS A WHOLE REVEALS AN ATTEMPT TO INJECT ADDITIONAL MEANING INTO THE CONCEPT OF INVIOABILITY GOING BEYOND THAT OF THE BAN OF THE USE OF FORCE.

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AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CINCPAC

CINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 5822

MILITARY ADDRESSEES FOR POLADS

- THE TREATIES ("WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN
SECURITY") MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 6
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PROBABLY REFER TO THE EASTERN TREATIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY AND TO THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. IN THIS WAY,
THE SOVIET UNION EXPLICITLY ASSUMES VIS-A-VIS THE GDR AN
OBLIGATION FOR THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE QUADRIPARTITE
AGREEMENT, WHICH IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN VIEW OF THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN
ARTICLE 7 (SEE BELOW NO. 8). INVERSELY, THE GDR NOW COMMITS
ITSELF VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
BASIC TREATY. THE CONNECTION ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE
OBSERVANCE OF THE TREATIES AND DEFENCE AGAINST REVANCHISM AND
MILITARISM AT THE SAME TIME MEANS THAT ANY INTERPRETATION AND

APPLICATION OF THESE TREATIES DEPARTING FROM THE SOVIET INTERPREATION AND APPLICATION WOULD BE REGARDED AS REVANCHIST AND MILITARIST.

10. THE FACT THAT THE TREATY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR A LONG TIME AND HAS BEEN HIGHLY CAREFULLY WORDED WITH A VIEW TO THE LONG-TERM INTENTIONS OF THE TWO CONTRACTING PARTIES IS SHOWN PARTICULARLY IN ARTICLE 7 WHICH IS DEVOTED TO BERLIN. THIS ARTICLE SAYS THAT -THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR WILL MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP "CONNECTIONS" WITH WEST BERLIN;
- THE BASIS FOR THESE "CONNECTIONS" IS THAT WEST BERLIN "DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND CONTINUES NOT TO BE GOVERNED BY IT";

- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS CONDITION, THE "CONNECTIONS" BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR AND WEST BERLIN MUST BE SEPARATED FROM THE RELATIONS WHICH THESE TWO STATES MAINTAIN WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY;

- THE "CONNECTIONS" BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS THE GDR ARE, BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 7, PLACED AT THE SAME LEVEL AS THE TIES BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, I.E. THAT OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN RELATIONS.

11. THUS, ARTICLE 7 REPEATS IN SUBSTANCE - ALTHOUGH NOT IN FORM- THE OLD SOVIET THESIS OF THE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY OF WEST BERLIN AS IT HAD BEEN EXPLICITLY CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE TREATY OF 1964. HOWEVER, AN ATTEMPT IS NOW MADE TO BUTTRESS THIS THESIS BY REFERRING TO THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT: BY PLACING THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN SECTION II B
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OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT INTO A DIFFERENT ORDER, THE IMPRESSION IS CREATED AS IF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT GENERALLY SETTLED RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. AS FAR AS RELATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ARE CONCERNED, THE ONLY SENTENCE REMAINING WHICH IS INVARIABLY QUOTED IN ISOLATION BY THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT WEST BERLIN IS NOT PART OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND COULD NOT BE GOVERNED BY IT.

12. AS WAS TO BE EXPECTED, THE TREATY CONTAINS NO PROVISION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EAST BERLIN.

13. CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT
A TREATY SIGNED BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE GDR CANNOT ALTER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE AND ESPECIALLY DOES NOT AFFECT THEIR RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING BERLIN IN THE FORM IN WHICH THEY WERE REAFFIRMED IN THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.

14. THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT, IN WORDING THE TREATY,

THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN GREAT CARE NOT TO AGREE TO ANY MODIFICATIONS OF THE EARLIER FRIENDSHIP TREATIES BY WHICH ITS LEGAL POSITION IN GERMANY AND IN BERLIN WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLICITLY ABANDONED AND WHICH WOULD HAVE RISKED CONFLICTS WITH THE THREE POWERS BECAUSE OF OBVIOUS TREATY VIOLATIONS. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT CAN BE SAFELY ASSUMED THAT IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT IN ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY DOES NOT, IN CONTRAST TO THE CUSTOMARY PRACTICE OF THE SOVIET UNION, SPEAK OF A QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT "ON WEST BERLIN" BUT MERELY OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 3 SEPTEMBER 1971.

15. THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR CONTINUES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND BY THE BASIC TREATY UPON WHOSE SIGNATURE THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS EXPLICITLY KEPT OPEN IN THE LETTERS ON THE UNITY OF THE NATION WHICH WERE ACCEPTED WITHOUT PROTEST.

16. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE ERRONEOUS TO REGARD THE TREATY AS AN INTRA-BLOC AFFAIR. AFTER ALL, IT CONFIRMS OUR VIEW
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THAT THE USSR AND THE GDR CONSISTENTLY PURSUE THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO GERMANY AND BERLIN.

17. THE THREE POWERS, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ALSO MADE THEIR POSITION UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR BY PUBLISHING THE FOLLOWING TRIPARTITE DECLARATION ON 14 OCTOBER 1975:

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES WISH TO STATE THAT NO TREATY CONCLUDED BY ANY OF THE FOUR POWERS WITH A THIRD STATE CAN IN ANY WAY AFFECT THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS AND THE CORRESPONDING, RELATED QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS, DECISIONS AND PRACTICES. THEREFORE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CONCLUDED BY THE USSR AND THE GDR ON 7 OCTOBER 1975."

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